Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem
  in Pure Scoring Rules by Baumeister, Dorothea & Rothe, Joerg
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
44
36
v2
  [
cs
.C
C]
  2
8 N
ov
 20
11
Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the
Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules∗
Dorothea Baumeister and Jo¨rg Rothe
Institut fu¨r Informatik
Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf
40225 Du¨sseldorf, Germany
May 23, 2018
Abstract
The POSSIBLE WINNER problem asks, given an election where the voters’
preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated
candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and
Dorn [1] proved a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy of this
problem for the important class of pure scoring rules in the case of unweighted
votes and an unbounded number of candidates: POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-
complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule with
vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0), but is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto.
We take the final step to a full dichotomy by showing that POSSIBLE WINNER is
NP-complete also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0).
1 Introduction
The computational complexity of problems related to voting systems is a field of in-
tense study (see, e.g., the surveys by Faliszewski et al. [3, 4] and Conitzer [5] and the
bookchapters by Faliszewski et al. [6] and Baumeister et al. [7]). For many of the com-
putational problems investigated, the voters are commonly assumed to provide their
preferences over the candidates via complete linear orderings of all candidates. How-
ever, this is not the case in many real-life settings: Some voters may have preferences
over some candidates only, or it may happen that new candidates are introduced to an
election after some voters have already cast their votes. As mentioned by Chevaleyre
et al. [8] and Xia et al. [9], such a situation may occur, for example, when a com-
mittee whose members are to schedule their next meeting date by voting over a set of
proposed dates. After some committee members have cast their votes (and then have
∗This work was supported in part by DFG grants RO-1202/11-1, RO-1202/12-1, and RO-1202/15-1, the
European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES program LogICCC, and the SFF grant “Cooperative Norm-
setting” of Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf. A preliminary version appeared as a short paper [2] in
the proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-2010).
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gone on vacation where they are unavailable via email or phone), it turns out that some
additional dates are possible, so the remaining committee members have a larger set of
alternatives to choose from. Since the meeting date has to be fixed before the traveling
committee members return from vacation, it makes sense to ask whether the winning
date can be determined via extending their partial votes into complete linear ones by
inserting the additional alternatives. Similar situations may also occur in large-scale
elections, where the computational aspects of the related problems have more impact
than for small-scale elections.
In light of such examples, it seems reasonable to assume only partial preferences
from the voters when defining computational problems related to voting. Konczak and
Lang [10] were the first to study voting with partial preferences, and they proposed
the POSSIBLE WINNER problem that (for any given election system) asks, given an
election with only partial preferences and a designated candidate c, whether c is a
winner in some extension of the partial votes to linear ones. This problem was studied
later on by Xia and Conitzer [11], Betzler and Dorn [1], and Baumeister et al. [12],
and closely related problems have been introduced and investigated by Chevaleyre et
al. [8], Xia et al. [9], and Baumeister et al. [12]. In particular, Betzler and Dorn [1]
established a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy result of the
POSSIBLE WINNER problem for the important class of pure scoring rules.
Dichotomy results are particularly important, as they completely settle the com-
plexity of a whole class of related problems by providing an easy-to-check condition
that tells the hard cases apart from the easily solvable cases. The first dichotomy result
in computer science is due to Schaefer [13] who provided a simple criterion to dis-
tinguish the hard instances of the satisfiability problem from the easily solvable ones.
Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [14] established the first dichotomy result related to
voting. Their dichotomy result, which distinguishes the hard instances from the easy
instances by the simple criterion of “diversity of dislike,” concerns the manipulation
problem for the class of scoring-rule elections with weighted votes.
In contrast, Betzler and Dorn’s above-mentioned result that is just one step away
from a full dichotomy is concerned with the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for pure scor-
ing rules with unweighted votes and any number of candidates [1]. In particular, they
showed NP-completeness for all but three pure scoring rules, namely plurality, veto,
and the scoring rule with scoring vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0). For plurality and veto, they
showed that this problem is polynomial-time solvable, but the complexity of POSSI-
BLE WINNER for the scoring rule with vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0) was left open. Taking the
final step to a full dichotomy result, we show that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete
also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0).
2 Definitions and Notation
An election (C,V ) is specified by a set C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cm} of candidates and a list V =
(v1,v2, . . . ,vn) of votes over C. In the most common model of representing preferences,
each such vote is a linear order1 of the form ci1 > ci2 > · · ·> cim where {i1, i2, . . . , im}=
1Formally, a linear order L on C is a binary relation on C that is (i) total (i.e., for any two distinct c,d ∈C,
either cLd or d Lc); (ii) transitive (i.e., for all c,d,e ∈ C, if cLd and d Le then cLe); and (iii) asymmetric
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{1,2, . . . ,m}, and cik > ciℓ means that candidate cik is (strictly) preferred to candidate
ciℓ . A voting system is a rule to determine the winners of an election Scoring rules
(a.k.a. scoring protocols) are an important class of voting systems. Every scoring rule
for m candidates is specified by a scoring vector ~α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) with α1 ≥ α2 ≥
·· · ≥ αm, where each α j is a nonnegative integer. For an election (C,V ), each voter v ∈
V gives α j points to the candidate ranked at the jth position in his or her vote. Summing
up all points a candidate c ∈C receives from all votes in V , we obtain score(C,V )(c), c’s
score in (C,V ). Whoever has the highest score wins the election. If there is only one
such candidate, he or she is the unique winner. Betzler and Dorn [1] focus on so-called
pure scoring rules. A scoring rule is pure if for each m ≥ 2, the scoring vector for m
candidates can be obtained from the scoring vector for m− 1 candidates by inserting
one additional score value at any position subject to satisfying α1 ≥α2 ≥ ·· · ≥ αm. We
will study only the pure scoring rule that for m≥ 2 candidates is defined by the scoring
vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0): In each vote the first candidate gets two points, the last candidate
gets zero points, and the m−2 other candidates get one point each. We thus distinguish
between the first, a middle, and the last position in any vote.
The POSSIBLE WINNER problem is defined for partial rather than linear votes. For
a set C of candidates, a partial vote over C is a transitive, asymmetric (though not
necessarily total) binary relation on C. For any two candidates c and d in a partial vote,
we write c ≻ d if c is (strictly) preferred to d. For any two sets A,B ⊆C of candidates,
we write A ≻ B to mean that each candidate a ∈ A is preferred to each candidate b ∈ B,
i.e., a ≻ b for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. As a shorthand, we write a ≻ B for {a} ≻ B and we
write A ≻ b for A ≻ {b}.
A linear vote v′ over C extends a partial vote v over C if v ⊆ v′, i.e., for all c,d ∈C,
if c ≻ d in v then c > d in v′. A list V ′ = (v′1,v′2, . . . ,v′n) of linear votes over C is an
extension of a list V = (v1,v2, . . . ,vn) of partial votes over C if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
v′i ∈V ′ extends vi ∈V .
Given a voting system E , Konczak and Lang [10] define the following problem:
E -POSSIBLE WINNER
Given: A set C of candidates, a list V of partial votes over C, and a designated
candidate c ∈C.
Question: Is there an extension V ′ of V to linear votes over C such that c is a winner
of election (C,V ′) under voting system E ?
This defines the problem in the nonunique-winner case; for its unique-winner vari-
ant, simply replace “a winner” by “the unique winner.” We focus on the nonunique-
winner case here, but mention that the unique-winner case can be handled analogously
as described by Betzler and Dorn [1]. We may drop the prefix “E -” and simply write
POSSIBLE WINNER when the specific voting system used is either clear from the con-
text or not relevant in the corresponding context.
(i.e., for all c,d ∈ C, if cLd then d Lc does not hold). Note that asymmetry of L implies irreflexivity of L
(i.e., for no c ∈C does cLc hold).
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3 The Final Step to a Full Dichotomy Result
Theorem 3.2 below shows that POSSIBLE WINNER for the scoring rule with vector
(2,1, . . . ,1,0) is NP-hard. Our proof of this theorem uses the notion of maximum
partial score defined by Betzler and Dorn [1]. Fix any scoring rule. Let C be a set of
candidates, c ∈C a candidate we want to make win the election, and let V = V ℓ∪V p
be a list of votes over C, where V ℓ contains only linear votes and V p contains partial
(i.e., incomplete) votes such that c’s score is fixed, i.e., the exact number of points c
receives from any v ∈ V p is known, no matter to which linear vote v is extended. For
each d ∈ C−{c}, define the maximum partial score of d with respect to c (denoted
by smaxp (d,c)) to be the maximum number of points that d may get from (extending to
linear votes) the partial votes in V p without defeating c in (C,V ′) for any extension V ′
of V to linear votes. Since the score of c is the same in any extension V ′ of V to linear
votes, it holds that
smaxp (d,c) = score(C,V ′)(c)− score(C,V ℓ)(d).
The following lemma will be useful for our proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.1 (Betzler and Dorn [1]) Let ~α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) be any scoring rule, let
C be a set of m ≥ 2 candidates with designated candidate c ∈ C, let V p be a list of
partial votes in which the score of c is fixed, and let smaxp (c′,c) be the maximum partial
score with respect to c for all c′ ∈C−{c}. Suppose that the following two properties
hold:
1. There is a candidate d ∈C−{c} such that smaxp (d,c)≥ α1|V p|.
2. For each c′ ∈C−{c}, the maximum partial score of c′ with respect to c can be
written as a linear combination of the score values, smaxp (c′,c) = ∑mj=1 n jα j, with
m = |C|, n j ∈ N, and ∑mj=1 n j ≤ |V p|.
Then a list V ℓ of linear votes can be constructed in polynomial time such that for
all c′ ∈C−{c}, score(C,V ℓ)(c′) = score(C,V ′)(c)− smaxp (c′,c), where V ′ is an extension
of V p to linear votes.
Theorem 3.2 POSSIBLE WINNER (both in the nonunique-winner case and in the
unique-winner case) is NP-complete for the pure scoring rule with scoring vector
(2,1, . . . ,1,0).
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. Our NP-hardness proof uses a reduction from
the NP-complete HITTING SET problem (see, e.g., [15]), which is defined as follows:
HITTING SET
Given: A finite set X , a collection S = {S1, . . . ,Sn} of nonempty subsets of X
(i.e., /0 6= Si ⊆ X for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and a positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′| ≤ k such that X ′ contains at least one
element from each subset in S ?
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Let (X ,S ,k) be a given HITTING SET instance with X = {e1,e2, . . . ,em} and
S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sn}. From (X ,S ,k) we construct a POSSIBLE WINNER instance
with candidate set
C = {c,h}∪{xi,x1i ,x2i , . . . ,xni ,y1i ,y2i , . . . ,yni ,z1i ,z2i , . . . ,zni | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
and designated candidate c. The list of votes V =V ℓ∪V p consists of a list V ℓ of linear
votes and a list V p of partial votes. V p =V p1 ∪V
p
2 ∪V
p
3 consists of three sublists:
1. V p1 contains k votes of the form h ≻C−{h,x1,x2, . . . ,xm} ≻ {x1,x2, . . . ,xm}.
2. V p2 contains the following 2n+ 1 votes for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
vi : h ≻C−{h,xi,y1i } ≻ {xi,y1i },
v
j
i : y
j
i ≻C−{y
j
i ,z
j
i ,h} ≻ h for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
w
j
i : x
j
i ≻C−{x
j
i ,y
j+1
i ,z
j
i } ≻ y
j+1
i for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
wni : x
n
i ≻C−{xni ,zni ,h} ≻ h.
3. V p3 contains the vote Tj ≻C−{Tj,h} ≻ h for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where
Tj = {x ji | ei ∈ S j}.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the maximum partial scores with respect to
c are set as follows:
smaxp (xi,c) = |V p|− 1
smaxp (x
j
i ,c) = |V
p|+ 1
smaxp (y
j
i ,c) = s
max
p (z
j
i ) = |V
p|
smaxp (h,c) ≥ 2|V p|.
This means that each xi must take at least one last position, which is possible in the
votes from V p1 and the votes vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, from V
p
2 . Since the candidates x
j
i can
never take a last position, they may take at most one first position. For y ji and z
j
i , the
maximum partial scores with respect to c are set such that for each first position they
take, they must also take at least one last position. Finally, h can never beat c. By
Lemma 3.1, we can construct a list of votes V ℓ such that all candidates other than c can
get only their maximum partial scores with respect to c in the partial votes.
We claim that (X ,S ,k) is a yes-instance of HITTING SET if and only if c is a
possible winner in (C,V ), using the scoring rule with vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0).
From left to right, suppose there exists a hitting set X ′⊆X with |X ′| ≤ k for S . The
partial votes in V p can then be extended to linear votes such that c wins the election as
follows:
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ei ∈ X ′ ei 6∈ X ′
V p1 : h > · · ·> xi
V p2 : vi : h > · · ·> xi > y1i h > · · ·> y1i > xi
v
j
i ,1 ≤ j ≤ n : y ji > · · ·> z ji z ji > y ji > · · ·> h
w
j
i ,1 ≤ j < n : z ji > x ji > · · ·> y j+1i x ji > · · ·> y j+1i > z ji
wni : z
n
i > x
n
i > · · ·> h xni > · · ·> h > zni
V p3 : x
j
i > · · ·> h for some j ∈ {ℓ | ei ∈ Sℓ}
Every xi takes one last position and get his or her maximum partial score with
respect to c. For ei ∈ X ′, all y ji take exactly one first, one last, and a middle position
in all remaining votes. For ei 6∈ X ′, all y ji take middle positions only. So they always
get their maximum partial scores with respect to c. The candidates z ji also get their
maximum partial scores with respect to c, since they always get one first position, one
last position, and a middle poisition in all remaining votes. Every candidate x ji gets at
most one first position and therefore does not exceed his or her maximum partial score
with respect to c. Since no candidate exceeds his or her maximum partial score with
respect to c, candidate c is a winner in this extension of the list V p of partial votes.
Conversely, assume that c is a possible winner for (C,V ). Then no candidate may
get more points in V p than his or her maximum partial score with respect to c. Since
at most k different xi may take a last position in V p1 , at least n− k different xi must take
a last position in vi. Fix any i such that xi is ranked last in vi. We now show that it is
not possible that a candidate x ji then takes a first position in any vote of V
p
3 . Since xi
takes the last position in vi, y1i takes a middle position in this vote and gets one point.
The only vote in which the score of y1i is not fixed is v1i . Without the points from this
vote, y1i already gets |V p| − 1 points, so y1i cannot get two points in v1i , and z1i takes
the first position in v1i . Without the points from w1i , z1i gets |V p| points and must take
the last position in w1i . The first position in w1i is then taken by x1i , so x1i cannot take a
first position in any vote from V p3 . Candidate y2i gets one point in w1i , and by a similar
argument as above, x2i is placed at the first position in w2i . Repeating this argument, we
have that for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, x ji is placed at the first position in w ji and thus cannot
take a first position in a vote from V p3 . This means that all first positions in the votes
of V p3 must be taken by those x
j
i for which xi takes the last position in a vote from V
p
1 .
This is possible only if the x ji are not at the first position in w
j
i . Thus z
j
i must take this
position. Due to z ji ’s maximum partial score with respect to c, this is possible only if
z ji takes the last position in v
j
i . Then y
j
i takes the first position in this vote. This is
possible, since y ji can take a middle position in vi for j = 1, and in v ji for 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
Hence all x ji , where xi takes the last position in the votes of V
p
1 , may take the first
position in the votes of V p3 . Thus, by the definition of V
p
3 (which, recall, contains the
vote Tj ≻C−{Tj,h}≻ h for each j, 1≤ j ≤ n, where Tj = {x ji | ei ∈ S j}), the elements
ei corresponding to those xi must form a hitting set of size at most k for S . ❑
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4 Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper, we have taken the final step to a full dichotomy theorem for the POSSIBLE
WINNER problem with unweighted votes and an unbounded number of candidates in
pure scoring rules. Our result complements the results of Betzler and Dorn [1] by
showing that POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for the pure scoring rule with vector
(2,1, . . . ,1,0), the one missing case in [1].
Besides establishing this dichotomy theorem, our result has also other conse-
quences. Since POSSIBLE WINNER is a special case of the SWAP BRIBERY problem
introduced by Elkind et al. [16], Theorem 3.2 implies that this problem is NP-hard for
the pure scoring rule with vector (2,1, . . . ,1,0) as well. Informally put, in a SWAP
BRIBERY instance an external agent seeks to make a distinguished candidate c win the
election by bribing some voters so as to swap adjacent candidates in their preference
orders (see [16] for formal details).
On the other hand, the POSSIBLE WINNER problem generalizes the COALITIONAL
UNWEIGHTED MANIPULATION problem where a group of strategic voters, knowing
the preferences of the nonstrategic voters, seeks to make their favorite candidate win
by reporting insincere preferences. An instance of this manipulation problem can be
seen as a POSSIBLE WINNER instance in which all nonstrategic voters report (sincere)
complete linear orderings of all candidates, whereas all strategic voters initially have
empty preference lists, and the question is whether they can extend them to complete
linear orderings of all candidates such that their favorite candidate wins.
The NP-hardness result of Theorem 3.2 has no direct consequence for the complex-
ity of this more special problem, and neither so for other more special variants of POS-
SIBLE WINNER, such as POSSIBLE WINNER WITH RESPECT TO THE ADDITION OF
NEW CANDIDATES (see Chevaleyre et al. [8], Xia et al. [9], and Baumeister et al. [12]).
Note that the complexity of the COALITIONAL WEIGHTED MANIPULATION problem,
where all votes are weighted and the weights of all manipulators are known initially
in addition to the weights and preferences of the nonmanipulators, is well understood
(see the work of Conitzer et al. [17]), and even a dichotomy theorem for scoring rules
due to Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [14] is known for weighted votes. However,
the complexity of COALITIONAL UNWEIGHTED MANIPULATION is still unknown for
many voting systems, including many scoring rules. Only recently Betzler et al. [18]
and Davies et al. [19] independently showed that COALITIONAL UNWEIGHTED MA-
NIPULATION, even for only two manipulators, is NP-complete for Borda elections,
where Borda with m candidates is the scoring rule with vector (m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,0).
Further complexity results regarding the COALITIONAL UNWEIGHTED MANIPULA-
TION problem for various voting systems are due to Faliszewski et al. [20, 21], Narodyt-
ska et al. [22], Xia et al. [23, 24], and Zuckerman et al. [25, 26]. None of these papers
establishes a dichotomy theorem for manipulation in the unweighted case, although
dichotomy results for scoring rules are now known for two of its generalizations, the
COALITIONAL WEIGHTED MANIPULATION problem (see [14]) and the (unweighted)
POSSIBLE WINNER problem (see [1] and this paper). For future research, we pro-
pose to tackle the open problem of finding a dichotomy result for COALITIONAL UN-
WEIGHTED MANIPULATION in scoring rules.
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